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ABSTRACT
The researcher examined self-concept/self-image and self-concept
maintenance processes in response to self-image threat. Replicating previous
research, the researcher hypothesized that those who had self-image threatened
would not engage in derogatory behavior in order to maintain self-concept (Fein
& Spencer, 1997). Participants completed a false intelligence test giving
negative, neutral, or positive feedback and were given an opportunity to evaluate
members of a locally stereotyped or locally nonstereotyped social group for a
hypothetical job position. No significant main effects or interactions were found
for feedback or applicant social group on participant evaluations of applicants,
indicating that derogation did not influence judgements in the current sample.
Furthermore, it was hypothesized that emotion variables would explain more
variance in participant evaluations of applicants following feedback than
previously used self-concept variables. Neither self-esteem nor emotion were
found to significantly predict derogation; however, stability in general selfconcept, a measure not used in previous work examining factors affecting
derogation, was found to significantly predict derogation, consistent with theory.
Keywords: self-concept, self-image, derogation, self-image maintenance,
stereotype
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INTRODUCTION
Judgments of qualities, traits, and skills of other individuals are often
influenced by appraisals of other qualities of the judged individual, for example,
the cultural and/or physical characteristics of the individual. Judgments and
appraisals can also be influenced by characteristics of the individual providing
the judgement, such as beliefs, attitudes, and emotional state. These appraisals
can often be automatic and with little awareness or insight as to the factors
influencing the judgments or appraisals made (DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, &
Cajdrie, 2004). One factor that can influence these judgments and appraisals of
others is the judge’s own self-concept, an objective self-perception that
individuals seek to maintain. Self-esteem, the emotional evaluation of one’s selfconcept that varies from positive to negative, is more pliable than self-concept,
which has been theorized to be generally stable (Epstein, 1973). At times,
maintenance of self-concept must occur in the face of conflicting feedback such
as the belief that oneself is intelligent despite receiving a poor grade on an exam.
According to Fein and Spencer (1997), in order to maintain a positive selfconcept, individuals often engage in derogation of others in order to restore
altered self-concept and self-esteem. The current study examines factors that
affect self-concept and self-esteem and how this might affect subsequent
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judgments and appraisals of others. Further, the study examines whether
derogation of others is a response to the negative affect produced by the
negative information as opposed to a challenge to the individuals’ self-concept.
Self-Concept
The self-perception of one’s own overall personality and individual
characteristics forms the individual’s self-concept, also referred to as self-image
(Bailey, II, 2003). Self-concept is created from the association of the self with
attributes such as academic, social, physical, and emotional abilities (Byrne,
1984). One example could be an athlete who associates themselves with agility
or a professor who associates themselves with intelligence. Although the
strength of association may vary, appraisal of the association (positive or
negative feelings towards the attribute) is not included in one’s self-concept and
is conceptualized as self-esteem when engaging in appraisal of attributes of the
self (Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, Mellott, 2002). Overall selfconcept is dynamic, changing through experience to allow for changes in
personality and behavior. As individuals recognize the traits that best define
them, they can develop interests and goals based on those traits. An individual
who recognizes strong reading ability within their self-concept may pursue books
and writing. As attributes of an individual change over time, such as the
knowledge a student gains throughout grade school, the self-concept held by the
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individual changes as well to reflect the self-concept at any point in time (Epstein,
1973).
Different models have conceptually structured self-concept to help relate
dimensions of self-concept as well as to explain behavior resulting from selfconcept. Four different models of self-concept have been proposed. The simplest
model, termed nomothetic, is a unidimensional model in which self-concept
characteristics are used to describe behavior without separating attributes or
facets as they are termed; that is, there is a singular self-concept that is
comprised of multiple attributes (Byrne, 1984). The hierarchical model is
constructed with several general attribute self-concepts divided into situation
specific self-concepts arranged into a hierarchy. For example, test-taking ability
may exist as a specific facet of academic self-concept which is itself a facet of
general self-concept. Specific facets are proportionally related, and the relative
stability of facets increases with increasing rank within the hierarchy. For
example, general self-concept is more stable than academic self-concept, a
lower order attribute, which is itself more stable than math self-concept. This
hierarchy creates a relatively stable general self-concept within an individual at
the top of the hierarchy while situation specific facets at lower levels of the
hierarchy may change more readily (Byrne, 1984). A third model, the taxonomic
model, describes facets of self-concept as independent from others, making
them semiautonomous. This model does allow for a general self-concept to exist
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in addition to specific facets; however, individual facets are not related (Byrne,
1984). Finally, the compensatory model provides for the existence of a general
self-concept but relates facets of self-concept as being inversely related (Byrne,
1984). This structure implies that a deficiency in one facet may allow for strength
in another facet. For example, students who are not able to perform strongly in
an academic setting may nonetheless perform well in social settings. Overall,
these four models differ in the relationships among facets of self-concept or the
specific facets that comprise the self-concept. They are similar through the idea
that a general self-concept exists to provide a summary self-concept to the
holder. The current study uses the framework of the hierarchical model due to
the ease of application to everyday situations as well as the ability to separate
broad attributes into more specific facets which may be independently studied.
It is important to note that self-concept is comprised of facets lacking
affect; that is, they do not include appraisals of whether the attribute is good or
bad. For example, one may include their ethnicity within their self-concept but not
how they feel emotionally towards that identifier. Assignment of valence to facets
implies the use of self-esteem, a separate but related construct (Greenwald et
al., 2002). Self-esteem involves the personal feelings towards aspects of selfconcept or towards self-concept as a whole. Any factors, such as race or gender,
which may help identify an individual would contribute to self-concept whereas
the appraisal of traits such as the belief that one is relatively good at a skill or
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personal feelings towards facets would contribute to self-esteem. The two are not
necessarily correlated positively or negatively as it is possible to feel positively
about a facet of self-concept such as the academic facet due to favorable
academic performance and yet also feel negatively about that same academic
facet if one believes that the academic performance also causes social
deficiencies. Although both self-concept and self-esteem rely on the perception
one has of themselves, self-concept involves an indifferent assessment of selffacets while self-esteem is directly related to personal feelings or attitudes
towards oneself (Pyszcynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004).
Due to the changing nature of individual identities and biological
development, self-concept should not be viewed as a static construct; however,
self-concept is fairly stable in short-term instances (Epstein, 1973). For example,
based on the hierarchical model, specific facets of self-concept are more easily
changed than general self-concept. Although the changing of attributes is normal
and contributes to an evolving sense of self, for example, when social interaction
skills develop throughout childhood, sudden changes of attributes can be
detrimental to maintaining a stable sense of self. These potential sudden shifts in
self-image are referred to as self-image threat and can often be evident in
common situations (Spencer, Fein, Wolfe, Fong, & Dunn, 1998). For example,
when a student receives a poor grade for an exam for which they felt adequately
prepared, the event may constitute self-image threat if their belief that they are
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intelligent is contradicted by their poor exam grade, creating an instance of
cognitive dissonance. To prevent potentially detrimental effects of self-image
threat, both preventative and reactive processes exist to alleviate cognitive
dissonance. These processes collectively make up an automatic process of selfimage maintenance. One preventative measure is self-immunization, the ability
to prepare for novel trait information through the identification of trait strengths
and weaknesses prior to receiving information dissonant with prior beliefs
(Greve, Enzmann, & Hosser, 2001). For example, self-immunization may be
employed if an individual recognizes that they are not skilled at running before
engaging in a footrace which they lose. The individual would avoid self-image
threat by recognizing their own deficiency in a specific attribute. Selfimmunization has been found to exist in participants who rated traits they
believed to be important to their own self-concept congruently with those they
possessed. However, self-immunization was unique in participants who scored
high in self-esteem (Greve & Wentura, 2010), suggesting that self-immunization
is effective in those who had established a clear and understood self-image and
also had high self-esteem in their own abilities. For example, for the previous
student who performed poorly on an exam, self-immunization would occur if they
were aware of their weaknesses in the exam material and prepared for the
possibility to perform worse than anticipated. One reactive method of contending
with self-image threat is coping. Coping refers to the ability to adapt to new
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attribute information as it arises, without responding to the information as a
threat. This process incorporates new information into self-concept facets, thus
allowing for self-image threat to be avoided and preserving self-concept integrity
(Greve et al., 2001). A study of university students revealed that the ability to
cope with trait information incongruent with a previously established self-image
was positively related to self-esteem. Students exhibiting high self-esteem were
able to resolve cognitive dissonance situations while incorporating new trait
information more easily than students exhibiting low self-esteem. These results
were used to propose that strong self-esteem may provide protection against
self-image threat (Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993). Coping would occur in a
student who accepts deficiencies in subject knowledge if they fail an exam and
then incorporate this information into their own academic self-concept in order to
address weaknesses in the future.
Emotional Influences on Judgement
An additional source of influence on judgements and appraisals is the
emotional state of the judge. Specifically, emotions can alter the appraisal
tendencies of individuals such as anger causing individuals to judge others more
harshly. These tendencies occur automatically and directly affect perception and
judgement (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). For example, anger, an emotional response
associated with intergroup competition and conflict, may directly contribute
towards tendencies for prejudice against outgroups (DeSteno et al., 2004). This
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emotional effect can be integral, meaning that the reaction to stimuli is producing
the affective state, or the effect can be incidental, meaning not contained within
the stimulus response but still affecting how the judge interprets information; that
is, people process affectively neutral information differently when in a positive or
negative affective state (DeSteno et al., 2004). Threats to self-esteem have also
been shown to produce affective reactions (Pyszcynski et at., 2004). Events
leading to a negative appraisal, especially in which negative feedback is received
relating to personal failure and self-esteem threat have a significant probability to
produce negative affect, especially anger (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). This could
result from an individual receiving negative feedback on an individual task such
as an academic test for which they are solely responsible for and had previously
thought to be well prepared for or had performed well (Lerner & Keltner, 2000;
Pyszcynski et al., 2004). With a change in affect, behavior could be influenced as
well. If anger were present in such an individual, judgement may be influenced
including the appearance of prejudices not previously salient and unrelated to the
precipitating feedback (DeSteno et al., 2004).
Background Study
Fein and Spencer (1997) investigated a potential connection between selfimage maintenance and prejudiced behavior. In their first experiment,
participants completed a self-affirmation task designed to affirm an aspect of their
self-concept. The task involved selecting a life value important to the participant
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and writing several paragraphs explaining the personal importance of the value
(Fein & Spencer, 1997). Participants then moved on to an evaluation task
requiring participants to evaluate a female applicant for a personal manager
position of a workplace using job application materials designed to portray an
applicant who was qualified for the position but not a “stellar” candidate (Fein &
Spencer, 1997). Photographs and video excerpts of applicants were included
and edited to portray a member of one of two ethnicities. Half of the participants
were shown details suggesting that the applicant was of Jewish descent and the
other half of participants were shown details suggesting that the applicant was
not of Jewish descent and was likely Italian. These ethnicities were chosen due
to salient stereotypes present at the location of the study (the University of
Michigan) related to the “Jewish American princess” (JAP), student willingness to
openly discuss such stereotypes, and the nonsalient nature of a minority group of
Italian women on campus (Fein & Spencer, 1997). Participants rated the job
candidate in terms of overall personality and job qualifications by indicating their
agreeance on a seven-point scale with statements regarding personality traits
potentially possessed by the candidate (Fein & Spencer, 1997). Participants also
rated the job candidate in terms of job fit by indicating their agreeance on a
seven-point scale with statements regarding qualifications and likeliness to hire
the candidate. Results of the first study suggested that participants in the selfaffirmation group provided less negative ratings of the “JAP” applicant than a
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control group not given a self-affirmation. Applied more broadly, it seems that
self-affirmation may reduce the likelihood of engaging in prejudiced behavior
(Fein & Spencer, 1997).
For the second study, participants were presented with an intelligence test
measuring verbal and reasoning abilities. Upon completion of the test,
participants were shown a predetermined percentile score which indicated poorer
than expected performance. This negative feedback created self-image threat as
opposed to the affirmation in the first study. The control group was told of the
bogus nature of the test and told to read it without attempting to correctly answer
any questions (Fein & Spencer, 1997). Participants then undertook a social
judgement task in which they read a short, fictional passage about a young man
living in New York City. The young man was either implied to be heterosexual for
half of the participants (indicated by use of the term “girlfriend” to denote his
roommate) or gay for the other half of participants (indicated by use of the term,
“partner” to denote his roommate) (Fein & Spencer, 1997). Participants then
used an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely) to rate the
young man’s personality on several dimensions. The results suggested that
individuals faced with self-image threat in the form of the negative feedback from
the false test are more likely to evaluate targets in a manner consistent with gay
stereotypes if the target is implied to be gay than if they are heterosexual. The
results also suggested that if self-image threat does not occur, no strong effect
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on evaluation should occur due to the lack of self-image threat activating a selfimage maintenance response (Fein & Spencer, 1997).
In the final study, participants were given a false intelligence test to
complete similar to the test used in the second study. Half of the participants
were shown results indicating they performed well (affirmation) and the other half
of the participants were shown results indicated they performed poorly (threat).
Participants then completed the same evaluation task from the first study.
Participant self-esteem was measured during this study following the revelation
of false test results to participants and following the evaluation task using a state
self-esteem scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Fein and Spencer found that
when participants were affirmed as opposed to threatened, the participants’ selfesteem was significantly higher than participants who experienced self-image
threat. Further, the degree to which participants engaged in stereotyped
judgments of the applicant was dependent upon whether they were affirmed or
threatened (greater stereotyped judgments when threatened) (Fein & Spencer,
1997).
Overall, Fein and Spencer (1997) used these studies as a basis for the
idea that stereotyping and prejudiced behavior may serve as a third method of
self-image maintenance aside from immunization and coping. In their studies, it
was demonstrated that participants showed a decreased likelihood to negatively
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evaluate a member of a stereotyped group if their self-image had been affirmed
and that participants showed an increased likelihood to negatively evaluate a
member of a stereotyped group if their self-image had been threatened. Their
research suggests that individuals faced with self-image threat and seeking
affirmation of previously held self-concepts will resort to “stereotyping or
derogation of a member of a stereotyped group [to] provide such situational
opportunities to restore a threatened self-image” (Fein & Spencer, 1997, p. 40).
Since the original publication in the Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, Fein and Spencer’s study has been cited in 1251 academic papers
and books on Google Scholar with little to no disagreement from authors.
Authors including Dr. Roy Baumeister have used Fein and Spencer’s study to
justify the inclusion of derogation and discrimination in self-esteem topics
(Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). The study is also mentioned in
less academic web pages including the Wikipedia entry for self-esteem and
various other pages. This creates a pattern of the paper being used by
researchers to discuss self-esteem but not to discuss self-concept or self-image.
Problems with Background Study
There are some issues with Fein and Spencer’s (1997) paper as
published which both detract from the strength of their arguments and lead to
some questions to be answered. One issue arises from assumptions readers are
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forced to make. Most of these assumptions exist due to a lack of justification for
decisions made in the studies. In the first and third studies, the ethnic groups
used (Italian American and Jewish American Princess) are discussed as being
appropriate for use due to conditions on campus. It is stated that the groups were
found to be salient towards students on campus, but it is not stated how this was
quantified to be appropriate for use in the study (Fein & Spencer, 1997). It does
not appear that any pilot testing was done to ensure the salience of stereotypes
regarding these groups (Fein & Spencer, 1997). Doing such a form of pilot
testing should be essential before using these groups as potential targets for
prejudice. It was indicated that pilot testing was carried out to ensure that the
details used to imply target ethnicity were sufficient, but this does not address the
stereotypes of the ethnic groups (Fein & Spencer, 1997). Based upon results
shown, it appears the stereotypes were indeed salient, but this cannot be
assured without pilot data or the necessary ancillary data. Ensuring salience is
especially important as without the presence of previously salient stereotypes
towards a population group, the prejudices expressed may have occurred
spontaneously, appearing without prior consideration. This would imply that the
prejudice is not specifically tied to participants finding a target suitable for
prejudice, but rather seeking out any opportunity to act in a prejudiced manner
towards another person.
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The two largest problems associated with Fein and Spencer’s (1997)
paper are issues on a scale affecting the premise of the paper. The first issue
relates to conflation of self-concept and self-esteem. As stated previously, selfconcept and self-esteem are differentiated through the assignment of valence to
the dimensions of the self-concept (Greenwald et al., 2002). Due to the presence
of valence in self-esteem, emotional appraisal is expected along with the initial
valence judgement. The topic of the paper is self-image maintenance processes,
yet state self-esteem is measured and treated as a suitable stand-in for selfconcept despite being a separate construct (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Greenwald et
al., 2002). The transference of self-image maintenance processes to self-esteem
requires justification which is not presented. This conflation creates another issue
for the premise that derogation of stereotyped individuals functions as self-image
maintenance. Such an occurrence depends on finding that the derogation
reaffirms self-image in individuals following self-image threat. However, from a
logical standpoint, nothing inherent in derogation of others should reaffirm
threatened self-image as academic performance and appraisal of others are not
closely related. In this research, academic self-concept was threatened but was
supposedly restored through a process unrelated to academic achievement.
Derogation of others may possibly affect social self-concept but not one’s own
academic self-concept. Per the hierarchical model of self-concept, academic
performance on the false test and social evaluations would constitute separate
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facets of self-concept (academic and social, respectively) (Byrne, 1984). If the
derogation is instead addressing valence properties of individuals, it may affect
self-esteem. However, conceptually, self-esteem and self-concept are
independent constructs, with only self-esteem including a valence component.
Instead, it may be possible that the derogation of stereotyped individuals
constitutes an emotional response to self-esteem threat. Emotional response
would affect valence judgements and could be used in a form of self-esteem
maintenance, but this is not the conclusion drawn by Fein and Spencer (1997),
who instead relied on a self-concept maintenance explanation. Therefore, the
impetus for the current study is to address these limitations of the original study.
Alterations for Correction
In their paper, Fein and Spencer (1997) provide evidence for a
phenomenon which requires a very precise sequence of events. Based upon
their conclusion, self-image threat initiated a very specific form of self-image
maintenance. The derogation of stereotyped individuals was taken to constitute
this self-image maintenance which reaffirmed the individual’s self-image.
However, the academic self-image was the exact recipient of the self-image
threat while the target of derogation was evaluated in a manner which did not
obviously relate to academic self-image. Given the hierarchical model of the selfconcept, social appraisals used as a form of self-image maintenance should
have no effect on academic self-image due to social self-image existing as a
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separate facet of general self-concept. Derogation was established to be a selfimage maintenance process which was capable of restoring self-image through a
separate construct, self-esteem (Fein & Spencer, 1997). This creates another
issue as self-esteem was conflated with self-concept/self-image despite being a
unique construct separated from self-concept by assignment of valence. Selfimage threat was manipulated through the use of a false test but was then
measured using a state self-esteem scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). Based
upon this error of operational construct definitions, the present study attempted to
replicate the study conceptually keeping self-image and self-esteem
independent.
While it is possible that self-image threat occurred in the original studies,
self-concept is generally fairly stable and should not be so vulnerable to threat as
to result in an outcome such as prejudice (Epstein, 1973; Fein & Spencer, 1997).
Instead, it is currently hypothesized that the prejudice witnessed was the result of
an emotional reaction to negative feedback. This negative feedback, in the form
of poor results on the false test, had the possibility to produce anger in
participants (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). If this effect was present in participants
receiving negative feedback, their appraisal and judgement abilities may have
been altered and even have resulted in incidentally prejudiced behaviors
(DeSteno et al., 2004). Whether or not the derogation of outgroup members was
the direct result of unrelated anger or due to changes in judgement abilities, it
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was presently hypothesized that it was more likely that emotional changes were
the cause for prejudice rather than self-image maintenance.
In order to provide evidence in favor of this hypothesis, Fein and
Spencer’s study was replicated in the current study with an effort to address the
limitations presented. The source of potential self-image threat, the false test, as
well as the evaluation task to provide a potential target of prejudice was used
(Fein & Spencer, 1997). Prior to taking the false test, in addition to after the test
and after the evaluation task, the same state self-esteem measure (Heatherton &
Polivy, 1991) was administered for participants to complete. Multiple data
collection periods allowed for more comprehensive monitoring of self-esteem to
be carried out. Galvanic skin response data were also gathered from participants
during all phases of testing to monitor changes in arousal indicative of changes in
emotion (Westerink, van den Broek, Schut, van Herk, & Tuinenbreijer, 2008). In
addition, a second self-report measure of emotion, the Brief Mood Introspection
Scale (BMIS) provided additional information concerning mood effects in the task
(Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). A self-concept measure, the Self-Description
Questionnaire III (SDQ-III) was also administered along with the state selfesteem measure in order to examine the independent contributions of selfconcept and self-esteem to the observed judgments (Marsh & O'Neill, 1984).
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The job applicants for the evaluation task were also modified. A pilot study
was conducted to determine suitable stereotyped and nonstereotyped minority
groups which were salient to students at Stephen F. Austin State University.
Local social group selection addressed two problems, the first being that the
ethnic groups used by Fein and Spencer (1997) were not saliently stereotyped by
the Stephen F. Austin State University student body; it also attempted to address
the construct validity problem in the original paper by ensuring that the stimuli
were conceptually replicated and validated to be salient within participants.
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METHOD
Participants
Participants were 113 undergraduate students recruited through an online
recruitment system from psychology classes at Stephen F. Austin State
University. Students received course credit for participation. Participants who
submitted demographic information were primarily female with white participants
making up the largest ethnic proportion of participants (M = 19.75 years, SD =
2.147 years). A detailed breakdown of sample demographics is presented in
Table 1.

Table 1. Sample demographic information regarding gender and ethnicity of
participants.

Measures
Arousal
Arousal was measured using galvanic skin response (GSR). Galvanic skin
response measures the arousal through the conductance of electricity via sweat
released from participants’ skin. This is accomplished by measuring direct
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current (DC) impedance through electrical sensors placed on the participants’
fingers and is recorded in terms of millivolts. Raised levels indicate increased
sweat and associated arousal. Sweat levels increase during periods of arousal
including variations in emotion (Westerink et al., 2008). The Biopac Systems kit
was used to measure GSR and reports were stored on a computer.
Mood
Mood was measured using the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS)
(see Appendix A). The BMIS is a 16-item mood scale which allows for
measurement of overall pleasant-unpleasant mood and arousal-calm mood with
subscales for positive-tired mood (comparing positively regarded mood
adjectives to a “tired” and a “drowsy” adjective) and negative-calm mood
(comparing negatively regarded mood adjectives to a “calm” adjective). Each
item requires the participant to respond on a four-point scale (definitely do not
feel, do not feel, slightly feel, and definitely feel) to an emotionally charged word,
for example, lively, happy, or content. For each scale or subscale, items which
are associated with the first identifier of the scale or subscale (i.e., pleasant or
arousal) are scored positively while items which are associated with the first
identifier of the scale or subscale (i.e., unpleasant or calm) are reversed scored.
All items can be added together to represent a score between pleasant and
unpleasant. An optional 17th item ascertains overall pleasantness of mood but is
listed separately and is in a different format (-10 to 10) (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988).
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Self-Concept
Self-concept was measured using the Brief Version of the Self-Description
Questionnaire III (SDQ-III) (see Appendix B). The SDQ-III is comprised of 136
items assessing 13 aspects of self-concept including mathematics, verbal ability,
school, problem solving/creativity, physical ability/sports, physical appearance,
same sex relationships, opposite sex relationships, parent relationships,
religion/spirituality, honesty/reliability, emotional stability/security, and general
self-concept. Each aspect is measured using 10-12 items. Positively regarded
items are scored positively while negatively regarded items are reverse scored
and items from each subscale are added together to create an aspect score with
higher scores indicating greater strength of an aspect (Marsh & O'Neill, 1984).
Strength in self-concept subscales relates to the degree to which a participant
feels they are proficient in an aspect or that the aspect adequately describes
them except for general self-concept. General self-concept refers to the clarity
with which an individual views their own self-concept, making the subscale
somewhat retrospective of the overall scale. Therefore, higher scores in general
self-concept reflect a strong sense of clarity of one’s own self-concept while low
scores indicate that participants may be unclear as to their own ideas about
themselves. Self-concept was measured to evaluate the degree of self-concept
changes due to self-image threat as well as the ability to restore self-concept
following a reaction to self-image threat. In order to reduce the overall number of
questions presented to participants, only the 62 items pertaining to the
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mathematics, verbal, school, problem solving/creativity, emotional
stability/security, and general self-concept were used as these items were
potentially related to the false intelligence test and the mood variable.
State Self-Esteem
State self-esteem was measured using the State Self-Esteem Scale (see
Appendix C). This scale is a 20-item scale measuring participant self-esteem at
the time of testing. The 20 items are divided into 3 subdivisions of self-esteem:
performance, social, and appearance self-esteem. Items are answered on a 5point scale according to how well the participant believes the phrase describes
them (1 = not at all, 2 = a little bit, 3 = somewhat, 4 = very much, 5 = extremely).
Thirteen items are reversed scored and can be combined to represent a total
self-esteem rating. High scores indicate strong feelings of confidence regarding
skills in each subdivision while low scores indicate feelings of deficiency
(Heatherton & Polivy, 1991).
Procedure
Pretest
Participants were told they were participating in two separate experiments
in a single session to conserve time. Participants were told they were first taking
part in a study of the relationship between test-taking abilities and emotion. After
providing consent, participants were fitted with galvanic skin response monitoring
equipment consisting of two electrodes applied to participants’ non-dominant

22

hand index and ring fingers and the system self-calibrated using Biopac Systems
software. Three data points were marked during the course of the study with the
first occurring at this time: a baseline reading at the beginning of the pretest.
Participants were then instructed to complete, in order, the State Self-Esteem
Scale, the Self-Description Questionnaire III (SDQ-III), and Brief Mood
Introspection Scale (BMIS) (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991; Marsh & O’Neill, 1984;
Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). These measures were completed on a computer using
Inquisit software. Each page was presented on a white background in black font
and allowed participants unrestricted time to respond to each item with five to
eight items displayed per page to allow for even spacing of items per scale.
Manipulation of Feedback
Participants were told that they would next complete a test designed for
students at their level of education and that the test would be completed on a
computer using Inquisit software. One third of the participants were assigned
randomly to the negative feedback condition. One third of the participants were
assigned randomly to the positive feedback condition. One third of the
participants were assigned randomly to the neutral feedback condition. For the
positive and negative feedback groups, participants were told that the test was
designed to study test-taking abilities in students and that they should attempt to
complete the items to the best of their ability. For the neutral feedback group,
participants were instructed to read through questions but to refrain from
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attempting to correctly answering questions correctly or thinking about questions
for any significant amount of time because the questions require more time to
complete than is allowed. The neutral condition allowed for participants to be
presented with the same academic material as other participants without
challenging or reinforcing self-esteem and self-concept. A three level design
allowed for comparison of both directions of change (positive and negative
reinforcement) to a neutral condition. Participants were told that the score
displayed at the conclusion of the test would be false and not indicative of their
true test-taking abilities. The purpose of the neutral condition was to ensure that
all participants were presented with identical materials for identical periods of
time between measurement periods for dependent variables.
All instructions for the test were displayed on the computer. The test
consisted of 25 questions pulled from advanced tests used for admission to
graduate school or law school (see Appendix D) (Council, 2007; Staff of Kaplan
Test Prep and Admissions, 2004). Constraining time limits were set for each
question to facilitate uncertainties about performance as sufficient time was not
available for each test item. For items pertaining to verbal ability, 15 seconds
were allowed for each item. For items pertaining to syllogisms, 30 seconds were
allowed for each item to account for the reading necessary for each item. A
maximum time of eight minutes and 15 seconds was allowed for the test. At the
conclusion of the test, the computer displayed a screen indicating a test scores in
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the form of percentile scores amongst other participants for 30 seconds and the
score was read to the participant using an audio file on the computer.
Unbeknownst to the participants, all percentile scores were predetermined in line
with the feedback condition assigned to each participant. The audio file
conveying percentile scores was designed with intentional pauses in cadence to
imply the message was being automatically generated by the program following
calculation of legitimate scores. The explanation consisted of the phrase, “You
scored in the “xx” percentile. This means that you scored higher than “xx” % of
other participants and that “xx” % of participants scored higher than you.”
Participants in the positive feedback condition were shown a percentile score
placing them in the 90th percentile amongst participants. Participants in the
negative feedback condition were shown a percentile score placing them in the
30th percentile amongst participants. Participants in the neutral feedback
condition were shown a screen thanking them for their participation.
Mid-Test
Participants were instructed to again complete the State Self-Esteem
Scale, the Self-Description Questionnaire II (SDQ-III), and Brief Mood
Introspection Scale (BMIS) in the same manner as during the pretest (Heatherton
& Polivy, 1991; Marsh & O’Neill, 1984; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). The Biopac
System continued collecting data with a second marker added to indicate the
beginning of the mid-test.

25

Evaluation Task
The evaluation task was portrayed as a separate experiment. Participants
were told that the first experiment had ended and that they were to proceed to an
experiment to study social evaluations and emotion. Participants were shown a
copy of a completed job application for a managerial position at an unspecified
local business. The application provided information about the applicant’s
previous work experience, academic and extracurricular skills and interests, and
other job-related information. The completed application suggested that the
applicant was sufficiently well qualified for the position but was not an
outstanding candidate (Fein & Spencer, 1997). An accompanying description of
position responsibilities was provided including necessary previous experience
and skills for the position at the unnamed business (see Appendix E). A
photograph of the applicant was also provided to the participant. The applicant
pictured was portrayed as either a locally nonstereotyped (marching band
member) or a locally stereotyped group (fraternity member) as determined by a
pilot study (see Appendix F). The picture was created using an image from the
Chicago face database which had a purple shirt and lettering indicating a
fraternity or a logo indicating the Stephen F. Austin State University Marching
Band (Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015).
Prior to experimentation, pilot testing was completed to determine local
stereotypes held by Stephen F. Austin State University students. This pilot study
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assessed salient stereotypes known to students as well as student openness to
discussion of these stereotypes. The pilot study was conducted online in two
parts. The first part defined social groups to participants and then asked them to
identify several social groups on campus as well as list physical and personality
characteristics of group members. From the first part of the pilot study, 110
unique social groups were identified. Social subgroups belonging to larger
groups such as specific sororities to sororities in general were combined and the
five groups identified by participants most frequently were selected for use in the
next part of the study. In part two of the pilot study, participants were asked to
rate each social group in terms of campus perception (positive/negative) and
personal perception (positive/negative) as well as identifying common
stereotypes for each group and the participant’s openness to discuss these
stereotypes with others. From this pilot study, a locally nonstereotyped
population (marching band members) and a locally stereotyped population
(fraternity members) were identified. The locally nonstereotyped population was
comprised of a local population for which no strong stereotypes existed for
Stephen F. Austin State University students. The locally stereotyped population
was comprised of a local population for which strong negative stereotypes
existed as well as which were readily and openly discussed by Stephen F. Austin
State University students.
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Participants from each feedback condition were randomly assigned to one
of the two stereotype conditions. Half of the participants were randomly assigned
to the locally nonstereotyped condition. The other half of participants were
randomly assigned to the locally stereotyped condition. Participants in both
conditions were shown the same completed application and description of
position responsibilities. The photograph of the applicant differed between
experimental conditions to portray a member of the corresponding stereotype
condition. The individual depicted in the photograph was the same person in
each photograph but had shirt details depicted to correspond with each
experimental condition.
Participants were allowed to look over the provided material for unlimited time
prior to completing questions on the computer using Inquisit software.
Participants rated the applicant in terms of overall personality (rating) and
qualifications for the job (suitability) using the same scales constructed by Fein &
Spencer (1997) (see Appendix G). The applicant rating scale consisted of 20
items (α = .919) and the applicant suitability scale consisted of four items (α =
.892). Personality was assessed by the extent to which participants agreed (on a
7-point scale) that each of the following traits described the applicant: intelligent,
insensitive, trustworthy, arrogant, sincere, inconsiderate, friendly, self-centered,
down-to-earth, rude, creative, materialistic, motivated, cliquish, ambitious,
conceited, happy, vain, warm, superficial. Negative traits (insensitive, arrogant,
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inconsiderate, self-centered, rude, materialistic, cliquish, conceited, vain,
superficial) were reverse scored to provide a single direction-oriented final score.
This score provided an integer-value rating of the applicant from the participant.
High scores for an applicant indicated a positive evaluation of the applicant from
the participant while low scores indicated a negative evaluation of the applicant
from the participant. Job qualifications for applicants were assessed by the extent
to which participants agreed (on a 7-point scale) with the following statements: “I
feel this person would make an excellent candidate for the position in question,”
“I would likely give this person serious consideration for the position in question,”
“I would guess that this person is in the top 20% of people interviewed,” and “I
felt favorably toward this person.”
Posttest
After completion of the evaluation task, participants were instructed to
once again complete the State Self-Esteem Scale, the Self-Description
Questionnaire III (SDQ-III), and Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS) in the
same manner as during the pretest (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991; Marsh & O’Neill,
1984; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). After completing the above measures,
participants completed a demographics form including items for age, gender, and
ethnicity. They were also asked to identify any social groups they believed the
applicant may have belonged to as well as if they identified with that group as
potential exclusion criteria as bias may have resulted from strong identification
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with a job applicant due to the effect of in-group bias. After placing a final marker
in the Biopac Systems software to indicate the conclusion of the posttest,
participants were then debriefed and were informed that they had completed a
single study. Participants were informed of the necessity of deception in order to
limit demand characteristics and responses due to social desirability. Participants
were also told that the purpose of the study was to investigate the effects of selfimage threat and emotion on judgment. The Biopac Systems software was then
stopped and the Biopac equipment was removed from participants. Participants
were thanked for their participation, given contact information for experimenters
in the event of further questions, asked to keep the procedure and contents of
the experiment confidential, and escorted out of the experiment area.
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RESULTS
Correlations Between Measures
Using baseline measurements, correlations were calculated for measures
to predict any potential relationships between measures and multicollinearity.
Correlations are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Correlations of measures at baseline

Manipulation Check
Using a factorial multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA),
manipulation checks were performed to ensure that the false intelligence test and
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evaluation tasks had significant effects on dependent variables relating to selfesteem (state self-esteem, performance self-esteem, social self-esteem, and
appearance self-esteem) and self-concept (math, verbal, school, problem
solving, emotion, and general). Independent variables were feedback group
(negative, neutral, and positive) and applicant social group (stereotyped and
nonstereotyped). All dependent variables were measured continuously, and all
independent variables were independent, categorical groups. Observations were
independent from each other for each independent variable. Sample size was
adequately large (111 ≤ n ≤ 113) for each measure with 18-20 participants per
experimental group. Two participants were excluded from the analysis of GSR
data due to errors in data recording. No significant outliers were observed in any
variables and multivariate normality was observed. There was a homogeneity of
the variance-covariance matrices and no multicollinearity. With all assumptions
satisfied, the MANOVA was carried out.
Overall tests of effect revealed that no statistically significant main effect
for feedback group existed, Wilks’ Lambda = .612, F(40, 176) = 1.234, p = .188,
ηp2 = .218. No statistically significant main effect for applicant social group
existed, Wilks’ Lambda = .924, F(20, 88) = .363, p = .994, ηp2 = .076.
Furthermore, no statistically significant interaction existed between feedback and
applicant social group, Wilks’ Lambda = .741, F(40, 176) = .713, p = .896, ηp2 =
.139. Looking at individual measures, there was a statistically significant
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difference in general self-concept based on feedback group, F(2, 104) = 3.651, p
= .029, ηp2 = .064. Post-hoc tests revealed that the positive feedback group had a
higher general self-concept score than both the negative and neutral feedback
groups as expected while no significant difference existed between negative and
neutral feedback groups (see Figure 1). No statistically significant differences
were found in any other dependent variables based on feedback group or
evaluation target. Based on these results, it was determined that failures to
manipulate occurred for most dependent variables relating to self-esteem or selfconcept except for the effect of feedback group on general self-concept. This
applied to changes in each measure from baseline to posttest although there was
no significant change from posttest to postevaluation.

Figure 1. Mean general self-concept score changes in relation to feedback group.
Positive values indicate increases in general self-concept score while negative
values indicate decreases in general self-concept score. Error bars indicated +/range of one standard deviation.
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A second factorial MANOVA was used to perform manipulation checks to
ensure that the false intelligence test and evaluation tasks had significant effects
on dependent variables relating to mood (BMIS pleasant-unpleasant, BMIS
arousal-calm, BMIS overall) and GSR. Independent variables were feedback
group (negative, neutral, and positive) and applicant social (stereotyped and
nonstereotyped). All dependent variables were measured continuously, and all
independent variables were independent, categorical groups. Observations were
independent from each other for each independent variable. Sample size was
adequately large (111 ≤ n ≤ 113) for each measure with 18-20 participants per
experimental group. No significant outliers were observed in any variables and
multivariate normality was observed. There was a homogeneity of the variancecovariance matrices and no multicollinearity. With all assumptions satisfied, the
one-way MANOVA was carried out.
Overall tests of effect revealed that no statistically significant main effect
for feedback group existed, Wilks’ Lambda = .802, F(16, 194) = 1.414, p = .138,
ηp2 = .104. No statistically significant main effect for applicant social group
existed, Wilks’ Lambda = .977, F(8, 97) = .289, p = .968, ηp2 = .023. Furthermore,
no statistically significant interaction existed between feedback and applicant
social group, Wilks’ Lambda = .858, F(16, 194) = .966, p = .496, ηp2 = .074.
Looking at individual measures, there was a statistically significant difference in
BMIS overall based on feedback group, F(2, 104) = 8.718, p < .000, ηp2 = .144.
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Figure 2. Mean BMIS overall score changes in relation to feedback group.
Positive values indicate increases in BMIS overall score while negative values
indicate decreases in BMIS overall score. Error bars indicated +/- range of one
standard deviation.

Post-hoc tests revealed that the positive feedback group had a higher BMIS
overall score than both the negative and neutral feedback groups as expected
while no significant difference existed between negative and neutral feedback
groups (see Figure 2). No statistically significant differences were found in any
other dependent variables based on feedback group or evaluation target. Based
on these results, it was determined that failures to manipulate occurred for most
dependent variables relating to mood and GSR except for the effect of feedback
group on BMIS overall. This applied to changes in each measure from baseline
to posttest although there was no significant change from posttest to
postevaluation.
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Replication of Fein and Spencer
The results of the original study indicated that participants who received
negative feedback would evaluate job applicants from a stereotyped group more
negatively than participants who received neutral or positive feedback or who
evaluated job applicants from a nonstereotyped group. To analyze the replication
of Fein and Spencer’s original study, a two-way ANOVA was carried out for both
dependent variables, applicant rating and applicant suitability. Participant
feedback group (negative, neutral, positive) and applicant social group
(stereotyped fraternity member vs. nonstereotyped marching band members)
were independent variables. Prior to analysis, data were screened for
assumptions needed. All dependent variables were continuous; independent
variables were categorical, observations were independent, significant outliers
were removed, the dependent variables were approximately normally distributed,
and homogeneity of variances for each group combination was confirmed.
A two-way ANOVA was conducted that examined the effect of feedback
and applicant social group on applicant rating, an evaluation of applicant
personality traits. There was not a statistically significant main effect for feedback
on applicant rating, F(2, 107) = 1.433, p = .243, Post-hoc Power = .301. There
was not a statistically significant main effect for applicant social group on
applicant rating, F(1, 107) = 3.194, p = .077, Post-hoc Power = .425. There was
not a statistically significant interaction between feedback and applicant social
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group on applicant rating, F(2, 107) = .588, p = .557, Post-hoc Power = .146.
Comparative means and standard deviations for applicant rating from feedback
groups and applicant social groups are presented in Figure 3. The analysis was
repeated excluding participants data for participant who indicated that they
personally identified with the job applicant, but results were not significantly
changed.

Figure 3. Mean applicant rating scores and standard deviations based on
feedback group and applicant social group. Error bars indicated +/- range of one
standard deviation.

A second two-way ANOVA was conducted that examined the effect of
feedback and applicant social group on applicant suitability, an evaluation of
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applicant suitability for the job position presented. There was not a statistically
significant main effect for feedback on applicant suitability, F(1, 107) = .399, p =
.672, Post-hoc Power = .113. There was not a statistically significant main effect
for applicant social group on applicant suitability, F(1, 107) = .155, p = .068, Posthoc Power = .301. There was not a statistically significant interaction between
feedback and applicant social group on applicant suitability, F(2, 107) = 1.599, p
= .332, Post-hoc Power = .301. Comparative means and standard deviations for
applicant suitability from feedback groups and applicant social groups are
presented in Figure 4. These results present a failure to replicate Fein and
Spencer (1997) as no statistically significant interaction between feedback and
applicant social group or main effects for feedback group or applicant social
group was observed. The analysis was repeated excluding participants data for
participant who indicated that they personally identified with the job applicant, but
results were not significantly changed.
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Figure 4. Mean applicant suitability scores and standard deviations based on
feedback group and applicant social group.

Comparing Self-Esteem and Emotion Predictor Variables
The second main hypothesis was that emotion variables would be better
predictors of derogation or negative evaluations than the self-esteem variable
used by Fein and Spencer (1997). This hypothesis was tested using a
hierarchical linear regression to predict job applicant evaluation in two forms,
applicant rating and applicant suitability. The model first entered the self-esteem
predictor variables used by Fein and Spencer (1997) followed by novel predictor
variables. The self-esteem predictor variables were state self-esteem delta (the
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change in self-esteem scores before and after feedback according to the State
Self-Esteem Scale), social self-esteem delta and appearance self-esteem delta,
two subscales of the State Self-Esteem Scale. Delta values were used as
opposed to raw scores because of the nature of the hypothesis. It was believed
that participants who were angered or otherwise upset by their feedback would
provide better predictive strength due to emotional changes compared to their
self-esteem changes. These changes could only be measured using differences
between variables before and after feedback. Performance self-esteem was not
included due to multicollinearity indicated by a strong correlation with state selfesteem delta (Pearson’s r (113) = .901, p < .001). Novel predictor variables
included delta values for BMIS overall and general self-concept from before and
after feedback. Data were screened for assumptions needed. Dependent and
predictor variables were measured on continuous scales. Independence of
observations was examined via a Durbin-Watson value of d = 2.001 and d =
2.234 for applicant rating and applicant suitability, respectively. Data points were
approximately linear and residuals showed homoscedasticity. No multicollinearity
was present as indicated by variance inflation factors which were below 3.2 for all
predictor variables. No outliers were found during standard data screening and
residual plots for each predictor variable presented normal distributions.
The first regression was conducted using applicant rating as the
dependent variable. Self-esteem variables were entered in the first block of
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predictor variables followed by general self-concept in the second block and
BMIS overall in the third block. Regression statistics are presented in Table 3.
The model revealed that the self-esteem model did not statistically significantly
predict applicant rating, F(3, 109) = .032, p = .992, R2 =.001 and no individual
predictor variable predicted applicant rating. When general self-concept was
added to the model, the model still did not statistically significantly predict
applicant rating, F(4, 108) = 1.750, p = .144, R2 =.061. However, general selfconcept did significantly predict applicant rating (β = .263, p = .010). Finally,
when the emotion variable, BMIS overall, was added to the model, the model still
did not statistically significantly predict applicant rating, F(5, 107) = 1.465, p =
.207, R2 =.064. Again, general self-concept predicted applicant rating (β = .247,
p = .019).
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Applicant Rating Regression Model
Std.
Variable
b
Error

β

Model 1

p

R2

ΔR2

.992

.001

.001

.061

.060

.064

.003

State Self-Esteem

-.048

.324

-.024

.882

Social Self-Esteem

.049

.667

.011

.941

Appearance Self-Esteem

.300

.962

.036

.756

Model 2

.144
State Self-Esteem

-.176

.319

-.088

.583

Social Self-Esteem

-.141

.654

-.030

.830

Appearance Self-Esteem

.331

.938

.039

.725

General Self-Concept

.972

.370

.263

.010

Model 3

.207
State Self-Esteem

-.228

.331

-.114

.493

Social Self-Esteem

-.117

.657

-.025

.858

Appearance Self-Esteem

.377

.943

.045

.690

General Self-Concept

.912

.384

.247

.019

BMIS Overall

.621

1.024

.064

.546

Table 3. Regression table describing applicant rating predictive strength,
significance, and explanatory power of models and individual predictor variables.

Reversing novel predictor variable entry order into the model (entering the
mood predictor variable second followed by the self-concept predictor variable)
did not significantly change the explanatory power of either model. Regression
statistics are presented in Table 4. When BMIS overall was added to the model,
the model did not statistically significantly predict applicant rating, F(4, 108) =
.400, p = .808, R2 =.015. No individual predictor variable predicted applicant
rating. When general self-concept was added to the model, the model still did not
statistically significantly predict applicant rating, F(5, 107) = 1.465, p = .207, R2
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=.064. However, general self-concept did significantly predict applicant rating (β
= .247, p = .019).
Applicant Rating Regression Model (Reverse Entry)
b

Std. Error

β

State Self-Esteem

-.048

.324

-.024

.882

Social Self-Esteem

.049

.667

.011

.941

Appearance Self-Esteem

.300

.962

.036

.756

State Self-Esteem

-.168

.338

-.084

.619

Social Self-Esteem

.074

.666

.016

.912

Appearance Self-Esteem

.396

.963

.047

.682

BMIS Overall

1.241

1.012

.128

.223

Variable

Model 1

Model 2

p

R2

ΔR2

.992

.001

.001

.015

.014

.064

.049

.808

Model 3

.207
State Self-Esteem

-.228

.331

-.114

.493

Social Self-Esteem

-.117

.657

-.025

.858

Appearance Self-Esteem

.377

.943

.045

.690

BMIS Overall

.621

1.024

.064

.546

General Self-Concept

.912

.384

.247

.019

Table 4. Regression table describing applicant rating predictive strength,
significance, and explanatory power of models and individual predictor variables
with novel predictors entered in reverse order.

Despite the inability for the models to predict applicant rating overall,
general self-concept was able to predict applicant rating individually at a
significant level in both entry orders. Furthermore, entry of general self-concept
into the model increased the predictive power of each overall model significantly
(ΔR2 = .060, ΔF = 6.898, p = .010 and ΔR2 = .049, ΔF = 5.656, p = .019,
respectively). Entry of BMIS overall into the model did not increase the predictive
power of each overall model significantly (ΔR2 = .003, ΔF = .367, p = .546 and
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ΔR2 = .014, ΔF = 1.504, p = .223, respectively). The analysis was repeated
excluding participants data for participant who indicated that they personally
identified with the job applicant, but results were not significantly changed.
The second regression was conducted using applicant suitability as the
dependent variable. Self-esteem variables were entered in the first block of
predictor variables followed by general self-concept in the second block and
BMIS overall in the third block. Regression statistics are presented in Table 5.
The model revealed that the self-esteem model did not statistically significantly
predict applicant suitability, F(3, 109) = .148, p = .931, R2 =.004 and no individual
predictor variable predicted applicant rating. When general self-concept was
added to the model, the model still did not statistically significantly predict
applicant suitability, F(4, 108) = .910, p = .461, R2 =.033. However, general selfconcept did marginally predict applicant suitability (β = .181, p = .077). Finally,
when the emotion variable, BMIS overall, was added to the model, the model still
did not statistically significantly predict applicant suitability, F(5, 107) = .745, p =
.591, R2 =.034. Again, general self-concept marginally predicted applicant
suitability (β = .190, p = .074).
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Applicant Suitability Regression Model
Std.
Variable
B
Error
β
Model 1
State Self-Esteem

.000

.096

Social Self-Esteem

.069

Appearance Self-Esteem

-.130

p

R2

ΔR2

.931

.004

.004

.033

.029

.034

.001

.000

.998

.197

.050

.728

.284

-.052

.649

Model 2

.461
State Self-Esteem

-.026

.096

-.044

.785

Social Self-Esteem

.030

Appearance Self-Esteem

-.123

.196

.022

.880

.281

-.050

.662

General Self-Concept

.198

.111

.181

.077

Model 3

.591
State Self-Esteem

-.017

.100

-.029

.862

Social Self-Esteem

.026

.197

.019

.896

Appearance Self-Esteem

-.131

.283

-.053

.644

General Self-Concept

.208

.115

.190

.074

BMIS Overall

-.104

.308

-.036

.736

Table 5. Regression table describing applicant suitability predictive strength,
significance, and explanatory power of models and individual predictor variables.

Reversing novel predictor variable entry order into the model (entering the
mood predictor variable second followed by the self-concept predictor variable)
did not significantly change the explanatory power of either model. Regression
statistics are presented in Table 6. When BMIS overall was added to the model,
the model did not statistically significantly predict applicant suitability, F(4, 108) =
.114, p = .977, R2 =.004. No individual predictor variable predicted applicant
suitability. When general self-concept was added to the model, the model still did
not statistically significantly predict applicant suitability, F(5, 107) = .745, p =
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.591, R2 =.034. However, general self-concept did marginally predict applicant
suitability (β = .190, p = .074).
Applicant Suitability Regression Model (Reverse Entry)
Std.
Variable
B
Error
β
p
Model 1

.931
State Self-Esteem

.000

.096

.000

.998

Social Self-Esteem

.069

Appearance Self-Esteem

-.130

.197

.050

.728

.284

-.052

.649

Model 2

.977
State Self-Esteem

-.004

.100

-.006

.970

Social Self-Esteem

.069

Appearance Self-Esteem

-.127

.198

.050

.727

.286

-.051

.659

BMIS Overall

.038

.301

.013

.901

Model 3

.591
State Self-Esteem

-.017

.100

-.029

.862

Social Self-Esteem

.026

.197

019

.896

Appearance Self-Esteem

-.131

.283

-.053

.644

BMIS Overall

-.104

.308

-.036

.736

General Self-Concept

.208

.115

.190

.074

R2

ΔR2

.004

.004

.004

.000

.034

.029

Table 6. Regression table describing applicant suitability predictive strength,
significance, and explanatory power of models and individual predictor variables
with novel predictors entered in reverse order.

Despite the inability for the models to predict applicant suitability overall,
general self-concept was able to predict applicant rating individually at a marginal
level in both entry orders. Furthermore, entry of general self-concept into the
model increased the predictive power of each overall model marginally (ΔR2 =
.029, ΔF = 3.188, p = .077 and ΔR2 = .029, ΔF = 3.260, p = .074, respectively).
Entry of BMIS overall into the model did not increase the predictive power of

46

each overall model significantly (ΔR2 = .001, ΔF = .114, p = .736 and ΔR2 = .000,
ΔF = .016, p = .901, respectively). The analysis was repeated excluding
participants data for participant who indicated that they personally identified with
the job applicant, but results were not significantly changed.
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DISCUSSION
Failure of Manipulation
A failure to manipulate occurred in terms of changes to scores in all
measures except for subscales relating to general self-concept and BMIS overall.
Any other changes in scores for other measure subscales were either not
significantly different across conditions or did not change significantly. According
to GSR data collected, participants in every feedback condition showed an
increase in skin conductivity, indicative of an increase in arousal. Participants
were all aroused and/or affected by the false-intelligence test, but the extent of
arousal did not differ between feedback groups, including the neutral feedback
group who were told not to attempt to accurately answer questions. It is possible
that overall, participants disliked the task and it affected them negatively in terms
of self-esteem, mood, and self-concept. However, significance in changes
according to feedback in the general self-concept and BMIS overall showed that
participants in the positive feedback conditions underwent significantly less
change from pretest to posttest in their respective scales. In this case, a possible
explanation is that after all groups were negatively affected by the task, the
positive feedback group was returned to near baseline levels, indicating a
restorative effect of the positive feedback after a negative change inducing task.
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A lack of salience to the feedback manipulation may have diminished any
potential effect from the applicant social group presentation. Participants may
have all viewed the false intelligence test as simply a difficult test without
interpreting the differing meaning of the percentile scores presented to them.
While the social group presentation was fairly obvious to participants in the form
of a picture with large logos on a shirt, the large amount of details regarding the
applicant may have overshadowed the pertinent detail. The full application
material set consisted of a job description and three pages of information
regarding the applicant before the final, potentially overlooked picture.
Furthermore, the salience of social groups used may have been lower than the
salience of social groups used by Fein and Spencer. Although pilot data are
unavailable regarding campus perception of the Japanese American Princess
social group, it was implied that the group was very well known to students and
that very strong beliefs about the group existed (Fein & Spencer, 1997). The
fraternity group used in the present study as the stereotyped social group, while
indicated in pilot testing as saliently prejudiced against, may have not presented
as strong of a reaction in participants as in the original study. This would be
necessary to investigate for any study wishing to construct similar comparative
social groups but was forced to be estimated for the present study.
The ability of the feedback condition and the applicant social group to
manipulate changes in general self-concept and BMIS overall call for an analysis
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of their differentiating characteristics from other subscales. General self-concept
is operationally described for the SDQ-III as measuring one’s own clarity of their
self. A strong general self-concept indicates that an individual has a clear sense
of their overall self-concept, the traits and characteristics that define them. This
subscale may be treated as separate from and uncorrelated with subscales such
as math self-concept or problem-solving self-concept (Marsh & O'Neill, 1984).
Similarly, BMIS overall is a subscale measuring overall mood using a single-item
measured on a different scale from other items (21 options vs. four options)
(Mayer & Gaschke, 1988). While the independent nature of these subscales
would help to explain why these two subscales were able to be manipulated
independently from other subscales, little insight is offered into why these general
self descriptors would alter differently across feedback groups while academic
subscales related more directly to the task did not significantly change at all. It is
possible that although the more specific subscales were not affected enough to
generate significant movement in scores, the more general subscales may have
been affected by the insignificant changes in several smaller subscales with an
additive effect to create an overall significant change. In fact, correlations
collected showed that prior to any potential manipulation general self-concept
correlated positively and significantly with state self-esteem and all three
subscales, indicating that as general self-concept increased, so too did selfesteem. Furthermore, general self-concept was significantly positively correlated
with problem solving self-concept and emotion self-concept (see Table 2). BMIS
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overall correlated significantly positively with the BMIS pleasant-unpleasant scale
as well. These correlations indicate that perhaps the subscales are not as
independent from other subscales as previously believed. Another possibility is
that participants have greater accuracy in assessing a global measure as
opposed to more specific inquires of their own set of characteristics or their
emotional state. Participants can more accurately estimate general
characteristics and moods describing themselves than they can for more specific
characteristics and moods, reducing measurement error.
Failure to Replicate
The manipulation check indicated that negative feedback and no feedback
(neutral) both showed decreases in self-concept (general self-concept) and in
mood (BMIS overall). However, neither self-concept nor mood change altered
applicant ratings of personality or job suitability. Differences between the present
study and the original may provide explanations for the inability to replicate
previous findings. The false-intelligence test and job application were designed to
closely resemble Fein and Spencer’s assemblies, but exact replicas were difficult
to construct. For the feedback groups, percentile scores for positive and negative
groups (90th and 30th, respectively) were different than those used by Fein and
Spencer (93rd and 47th, respectively) (Fein & Spencer, 1997). The most obvious
difference between the original and present study lies within the social groups
used as targets for derogation. The locally stereotyped group in Fein and
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Spencer’s original study was a Jewish American Princess population salient
stereotyped at their campus. Pilot information was referenced to justify this group
selection (Fein & Spencer, 1997). In order to identify a similar group locally, pilot
testing was conducted prior to the present study which identified strong, primarily
negative beliefs about fraternity members in general at Stephen F. Austin State
University and in addition, students indicated a willingness to discuss the
negatives for fraternal groups. The fraternity social group was determined to exist
primarily along social divisions amongst students although economic class and
ethnicity cannot be ruled out as additional factors that affected perceptions or
group identity. While Fein and Spencer used a group defined at least partially by
religion, the present study did not, which may have affected salience of
stereotypes. For the locally nonstereotyped group, local marching band members
were used as a comparative to Italian Americans used by Fein and Spencer
(1997). Again, characteristics of groups used by Fein and Spencer may not be
entirely comparable to those used in the present study due to the lack of ethnic
group identification. However, applicant social groups were defined in the present
study based on salient stereotypes help by participants in line with criteria for
groups outlined by Fein & Spencer (1997).
Predictors of Derogatory Behavior
Based on the present analysis, both the original measure used by Fein
and Spencer (State Self-Esteem Scale and subscales) as well as the emotion
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variables proposed for the current study (BMIS and subscales and GSR) were
poor predictors of derogatory behavior. Models constructed using these variables
failed to show overall significance. Individually, these variables also failed to
show significant predictive power for applicant rating or applicant suitability.
However, general self-concept scores did significantly predict applicant rating
when considered individually, apart from the overall model. General self-concept
also marginally predicted applicant suitability when considered individually, apart
from the overall model. While entry of general self-concept into models failed to
produce overall significance for the models, doing so did increase the predictive
power for models of applicant rating by a significant degree and applicant
suitability by a marginal degree.
The nature of general self-concept may provide insight into its predictive
quality for evaluations of others. Clarity, or a degree of certainty, of one’s own
perception of self-concept implies that as the general self-concept increases in
strength, an individual may be “more sure of themselves” and comfortable or
confident in the stability of their own self. This may give an individual greater
confidence to evaluate someone else and to do so in a more positive light. When
the judge feels certain of who they are and are comfortable accepting that self,
they evaluate others with positive regard. Those who are “unsure of themselves”
and do not have a clear self-concept may evaluate others negatively due to that
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uncertainty. For example, a teenager or middle-aged adult going through an
identity crisis may have trouble evaluating others accurately in this sense.
Implications
The failure to replicate presents one of two possibilities. The failure may
be due to a lack of true effect. Effects seen by Fein & Spencer may have been
attributable to local factors unrepresentative of other populations including the
present locale, and not generalizable to other samples. Perhaps, their sample
was particularly affected in the negative feedback condition, contrary to the
current sample. The second possibility is that the present replication was too
dissimilar to the original and improperly replicated the original study. Multiple
differences between the present study and the original study have been identified
such as different percentile scores for the feedback conditions and different
applicant social groups. These changes may have worked additively to create a
significantly different design which could not reproduce Fein & Spencer’s effect.
However, this would demonstrate a lack of robustness of the effect which would
cause it to exhibit little in vivo applicability.
A lack of the relevant effect, derogation driven by self-image threat,
potentially removes self-concept from derogation and prejudice theories.
Derogation seen by Fein and Spencer may have resulted from unknown
variables such as existing prejudices or other factors. For example, participants
in the original study exhibited knowledge and comfort discussing many
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prejudices regarding a Jewish subpopulation (Fein & Spencer, 1997). While the
pilot study for the present study indicated that many stereotypes existed for
fraternity members, the prejudices exhibited towards members of fraternities
locally may not have matched the strength of prejudices within participants in
Fein and Spencer’s study.
Although Fein and Spencer presented findings demonstrating that
changes in self-esteem were indicative of prejudiced applicant evaluations,
present findings showed that this was not the case for this sample. Furthermore,
mood and arousal were also not indicative of prejudiced applicant evaluations.
Fein and Spencer’s research insists that a novel self-image maintenance process
exists to protect threatened self-concept. The self-image maintenance process in
this case is derogation of others, specifically, prejudice of stereotyped groups
(Fein & Spencer, 1997). The derogation of such groups was believed to restore
self-concept to the previous status. However, though the manipulations were
able to affect general self-concept and overall mood, the effect is best seen as
the positive group showing improvement in these measures. The negative group
was indistinguishable from the neutral group. Given derogation is an essential
precursor to the process proposed by Fein and Spencer, seeing no effect of the
negative manipulation is likely a strong reason there was no derogation. As
mentioned, a stronger manipulation may be able to reproduce the effect.
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Due to general self-concept’s strength in predictive power for measures of
applicant rating and suitability, it may allow for clarification of previous findings by
Fein and Spencer (1997). Their original hypothesis stated that self-image threat
could lead to derogation of others. In the current study, it was demonstrated that
self-image threat, if it occurred, did not create significant changes in evaluations
of job applicants. Furthermore, Fein and Spencer’s use of self-esteem may be a
potentially inappropriate analog to self-concept based on literature discussing the
objective and subjective natures of self-concept and self-esteem, respectively.
The current evaluation of the potential misuse of self-esteem was strengthened
not only by the failure to replicate previous findings but also by the inability to
show significant predictive strength of self-esteem models for applicant
evaluations. However, self-concept did show predictive strength in this regard.
While Fein and Spencer may have created a problem by proposing that selfconcept was indicative of evaluations of others and then using self-esteem to
measure a separate concept, the underlying hypothesis may still hold some truth.
In the present study, general self-concept was predictive of evaluations of others,
significantly for applicant rating and marginally for applicant suitability. Fein and
Spencer’s exact effect of self-image threat leading to derogation proved to not be
replicable in the present study. However, the underlying idea of self-concept
affecting evaluations of others holds predictive significance. Therefore, the
present study may offer clarification of previous findings, that changes in selfconcept are predictive of evaluations of others. While self-image threat may not
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lead to derogation of others based on group stereotypes, it may be predictive of
social evaluations in general.
Despite initial research showing that self-esteem and self-concept exist as
separate theoretical constructs, present research shows that they may be more
similar than previously believed (Epstein, 1973). State self-esteem correlated
positively with general self-concept, generally speaking, and other subscales
from each construct intercorrelated. Such correlations may show that while selfconcept and self-esteem are theoretically different in terms of objectivity versus
subjectivity, respectively, the two may be operationally very similar for study or
broad application.
Limitations
Aside from construct limitations, physical limitations hampered the present
study. For example, planned sample sizes had to be readjusted to meet new
expectations based on participants not attending scheduled sessions. While final
sample size was deemed to be acceptable as it was higher than Fein and
Spencer’s (1997), it failed to meet proposed expectations based on power
estimates to estimate sample size. If effect sizes were generally smaller than
anticipated, it is possible the current study was underpowered.
Future Directions
Further research should be conducted to better separate self-esteem from
self-concept. While literature delineates them based upon subjective versus
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objective views, respectively, the results presented here indicate that selfconcept and self-esteem may be operationally similar or even identical based
upon correlations found between subscales of both constructs as well as the
inability to manipulate either in most subscales. During baseline measurement,
state self-esteem was highly, positively correlated with general self-concept (r =
.761, p < .01) as well as several other subscales for self-concept. Likewise, every
self-concept subscale significantly and positively correlated with performance
self-esteem as well as most subscales with social self-esteem and appearance
self-esteem. Greater clarity should be sought to help reshape operational
definitions for other researchers or to unify the concepts.
Present data also indicate that although negative feedback did not
produce derogation of applicants in stereotyped social groups, negative feedback
caused changes in general self-concept which was predictive of social
evaluations in general. Further study into broad effects of self-concept on social
evaluations may yield significant findings not only in terms of negative changes to
self-concept, but also in positive changes.
Conclusion
Results indicate that individuals did not engage in derogatory behavior in
response to self-image threat. Derogation due to social group differences may
not have been found in the present study either due to a lack of influence of
negative feedback or a lack of awareness of the stereotyped social group
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member. However, without any significant evidence of derogation in the present
study, any causes for potential derogation, including the proposed
emotional/mood-based model, cannot be properly evaluated. However, evidence
that general self-concept may be predictive of social evaluations supports
previous research suggesting that negative changes to self-concept could cause
negative social evaluations (Fein & Spencer, 1997). Further research is
warranted to uncover the causes of derogation as well as influences on selfconcept, self-esteem, and evaluations of others.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A – Brief Mood Introspections Scale (BMIS)
INSTRUCTIONS: Click the response on the scale below that indicates how well
each adjective or phrase describes your present mood.
(definitely do not feel)

(do not feel)

XX

X

Lively

XX

X

V

VV

Happy

XX

X

V

VV

Sad

XX

X

V

VV

Tired

XX

X

V

VV

Caring

XX

X

V

VV

Content

XX

X

V

VV

Gloomy

XX

X

V

VV

Jittery

XX

X

V

VV

Drowsy

XX

X

V

VV

Grouchy

XX

X

V

VV

Peppy

XX

X

V

VV

Nervous

XX

X

V

VV

Calm

XX

X

V

VV

Loving

XX

X

V

VV

Fed Up

XX

X

V

VV

Active

XX

X

V

VV

(slightly feel)

(definitely feel)

V

VV

Overall, my mood is:
Very Unpleasant

Very Pleasant

-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Appendix B - Self-Description Questionnaire III (SDQ-III)
1.

I find many mathematical problems interesting and challenging.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

2.

Overall, I have a lot of respect for myself.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

3.

I have trouble expressing myself when trying to write something.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

4.

I am usually pretty calm and relaxed.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

5.

I enjoy doing work for most academic subjects.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

6.

I am never able to think up answers to problems that haven't already been
figured out.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

7.

I have hesitated to take courses that involve mathematics.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True
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8.

Overall, I lack self-confidence.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

9.

I can write effectively.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

10.

I worry a lot.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

11.

I hate studying for many academic subjects.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

12.

I am good at combining ideas in ways that others have not tried.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

13.

I have generally done better in mathematics courses than other courses.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

14.

Overall, I am pretty accepting of myself.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

15.

I have a poor vocabulary.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True
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16.

I am happy most of the time.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

17.

I like most academic subjects.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

18.

I wish I had more imagination and originality.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

19.

Mathematics makes me feel inadequate.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

20.

Overall, I don't have much respect for myself.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

21.

I am an avid reader.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

22.

I am anxious much of the time.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

23.

I have trouble with most academic subjects.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True
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24.

I enjoy working out new ways of solving problems.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

25.

I am quite good at mathematics.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

26.

Overall, I have a lot of self-confidence.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

27.

I do not do well on tests that require a lot of verbal reasoning ability.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

28.

I hardly ever feel depressed.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

29.

I'm good at most academic subjects.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

30.

I'm not much good at problem solving.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

31.

I have trouble understanding anything that is based upon mathematics.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True
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32.

Overall, I have a very good self-concept.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

33.

Relative to most people, my verbal skills are quite good.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

34.

I tend to be high-strung, tense, and restless.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

35.

I'm not particularly interested in most academic subjects.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

36.

I have a lot of intellectual curiosity.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

37.

I have always done well in mathematics classes.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

38.

Overall, nothing that I do is very important.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

39.

I often have to read things several times before I understand them.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True
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40.

I do not spend a lot of time worrying about things.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

41.

I learn quickly in most academic subjects.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

42.

I am not very original in my ideas, thoughts, and actions.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

43.

I never do well on tests that require mathematical reasoning.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

44.

Overall, I have pretty positive feelings about myself.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

45.

I am good at expressing myself.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

46.

I am often depressed.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

47.

I hate most academic subjects.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True
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48.

I am an imaginative person.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

49.

At school, my friends always came to me for help in mathematics.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

50.

Overall, I have a very poor self-concept.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

51.

In school I had more trouble learning to read than most other students.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

52.

I am inclined towards being an optimist.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

53.

I get good marks in most academic subjects.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

54.

I would have no interest in being an inventor.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

55.

I have never been very excited about mathematics.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True
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56.

Overall, I have pretty negative feelings about myself.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

57.

I have good reading comprehension.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

58.

I tend to be a very nervous person.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

59.

I could never achieve academic honours, even if I worked harder.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

60.

I can often see better ways of doing routine tasks.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

61.

Overall, I do lots of things that are important.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True

62.

Overall, I am not very accepting of myself.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely False / Mostly False / Somewhat False / Somewhat True / Mostly True / Completely True
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Appendix C - State Self-Esteem Scale
This is a questionnaire designed to measure what you are thinking at this
moment. There is of course, no right answer for any statement. The best answer
is what you feel is true of yourself at the moment. Be sure to answer all of the
items, even if you are not certain of the best answer.
Again, answer these questions as they are true for you RIGHT NOW.
1. I feel confident about my abilities.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

2. I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

3. I feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

4. I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

5. I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

6. I feel that others respect and admire me.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat
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4
Very Much

5
Extremely

7. I am dissatisfied with my weight.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

8. I feel self-conscious.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

9. I feel as smart as others.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

10. I feel displeased with myself.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

11. I feel good about myself.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

12. I am pleased with my appearance right now.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

13. I am worried about what other people think of me.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

14. I feel confident that I understand things.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

73

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

15. I feel inferior to others at this moment.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

16. I feel unattractive.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

17. I feel concerned about the impression I am making.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

18. I feel that I have less scholastic ability right now than others.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

19. I feel like I’m not doing well.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat

4
Very Much

5
Extremely

20. I am worried about looking foolish.
1

2

3

Not At All

A Little Bit

Somewhat
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4
Very Much

5
Extremely

Appendix D - The Reasoning and Verbal Acuity Battery
The following is a new form of an intelligence test to be administered on a
computer. It measures both verbal and reasoning abilities. This test has been
validated in numerous studies throughout the United States and Canada. This
test consists of four sections, each tapping a different set of intellectual skills.
Research shows that assessment of these intellectual skills provides an ideal,
valid snapshot of an individual’s general intelligence.
You will have limited time to answer each of the following items. Please
mark each answer on the computer and proceed until you are told to stop.
Analogies
1. LUCID : OBSCURITY ::
a. ambiguous : doubt
b. provident : planning
c. furtive : legality
d. economical : extravagance
e. secure : violence
2. ATTENTIVE : RAPT ::
a. loyal : unscrupulous
b. critical : derisive
c. inventive : innovative
d. jealous : envious
e. kind : considerate
3. CLEAVER : BUTCHER ::
a. palette : artist
b. stage : dancer
c. dictionary : poet
d. lock : burglar
e. chisel : sculptor
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4. LITER : VOLUME ::
a. bottle : can
b. knob : radio
c. scale : height
d. gram : weight
e. juice : vitamin
5. HANGAR : AIRCRAFT ::
a. orchestra : music
b. vault : money
c. hand : fingers
d. farm : trees
e. ecosystem : insect
Antonyms
1. SCABROUS:
a. thorny
b. unblemished
c. perplexing
d. blank
e. examined
2. TRAIL:
a. age
b. depress
c. rule
d. wander
e. precede
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3. AMIABLE:
a. faithful
b. insulted
c. distasteful
d. indecent
e. unfriendly
4. ACUTE:
a. conspicuous
b. relevant
c. aloof
d. dull
e. distant
5. RECANT:
a. affirm
b. rectify
c. offend
d. ignore
e. withdraw

Sentence Completion
1. Although she earned her fame for her striking murals, the artist felt that
her sculpture merited greater ______.
a. disdain
b. acclaim
c. deliberation
d. viewing
e. publicity
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2. Because Gould’s theory has been neither completely rejected nor
completely accepted by the scientific community, its status remains
______.
a. repudiated
b. sanctioned
c. quizzical
d. preferable
e. debatable
3. The increasing acceptance of the notion that the news media is not a(n)
______ commentator upon events, but rather, a mouthpiece for the vested
interests of its powerful owners, demonstrates the public's growing ______
large corporations.
a. disinterested … mistrust of
b. meddlesome … suspicion of
c. official … apprehension
d. impartial … satisfaction with
e. manipulative … confusion with
4. We will face the idea of old age with ______ as long as we believe that it
invariably brings poverty, isolation, and illness.
a. regret
b. apprehension
c. enlightenment
d. veneration
e. reverence
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5. Despite much informed ______, the relationship between sunspot cycles
and the earth’s weather remains ______.
a. argument … decisive
b. confusion … tenuous
c. conjecture … ambiguous
d. evidence … clear
e. analysis … systematic
6. As a consequence of the Antarctic’s ______ climate, the only forms of
plant life to be found in the continent’s interior are a few ______ lichens
and mosses that cling to the frozen rocks.
a. rigid … hardy
b. extreme … mysterious
c. harsh … luxuriant
d. freezing … complex
e. changing … tiny
7. Conflict between generations may be a problem that has persisted for
centuries, but the nature and intensity of the conflict obviously ______ in
response to changes in social and economic conditions.
a. increases
b. disappears
c. declines
d. varies
e. wanes
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Syllogisms
1. Situation: Someone living in a cold climate buys a winter coat that is
stylish but not warm in order to appear sophisticated.
Analysis: People are sometimes willing to sacrifice sensual comfort or
pleasure for the sake of appearances.
The analysis provided for the situation above is most appropriate for which
one of the following situations?
(A) A person buys an automobile to commute to
work even though public transportation is
quick and reliable.
(B) A parent buys a car seat for a young child
because it is more colorful and more
comfortable for the child than the other car
seats on the market, though no safer.
(C) A couple buys a particular wine even though
their favorite wine is less expensive and better
tasting because they think it will impress their dinner guests.
(D) A person sets her thermostat at a low
temperature during the winter because she is
concerned about the environmental damage
caused by using fossil fuels to heat her home.
(E) An acrobat convinces the circus that employs
him to purchase an expensive outfit for him so
that he can wear it during his act to impress
the audience.
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2. After replacing his old gas water heater with a new, pilotless, gas water
heater that is rated as highly efficient, Jimmy’s gas bills increased.
Each of the following, if true, contributes to an explanation of the increase
mentioned above EXCEPT:
(A) The new water heater uses a smaller percentage
of the gas used by Jimmy’s household than did
the old one.
(B) Shortly after the new water heater was installed,
Jimmy’s uncle came to live with him, doubling
the size of the household.
(C) After having done his laundry at a laundromat,
Jimmy bought and started using a gas dryer
when he replaced his water heater.
(D) Jimmy’s utility company raised the rates for gas
consumption following installation of the new
water heater.
(E) Unusually cold weather following installation of
the new water heater resulted in heavy gas usage.
3. Carolyn: The artist Marc Quinn has displayed, behind a glass plate,
biologically replicated fragments of Sir John Sulston’s DNA, calling it a
“conceptual portrait” of Sulston. But to be a portrait, something must bear
a recognizable resemblance to its subject.
Arnold: I disagree. Quinn’s conceptual portrait is a maximally realistic
portrait, for it holds actual instructions according to which Sulston was
created.
The dialogue provides most support for the claim that Carolyn and Arnold
disagree over whether the object described by Quinn as a conceptual
portrait of Sir John Sulston
(A) should be considered to be art
(B) should be considered to be Quinn’s work
(C) bears a recognizable resemblance to Sulston
(D) contains instructions according to which Sulston
was created
(E) is actually a portrait of Sulston
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4. Many corporations have begun decorating their halls with motivational
posters in hopes of boosting their employees’ motivation to work
productively. However, almost all employees at these corporations are
already motivated to work productively. So these corporations’ use of
motivational posters is unlikely to achieve its intended purpose.
The reasoning in the argument is most vulnerable to criticism on the
grounds that the argument
(A) fails to consider whether corporations that do
not currently use motivational posters would
increase their employees’ motivation to work
productively if they began using the posters
(B) takes for granted that, with respect to their
employees’ motivation to work productively,
corporations that decorate their halls with
motivational posters are representative of
corporations in general
(C) fails to consider that even if motivational
posters do not have one particular beneficial
effect for corporations, they may have similar
effects that are equally beneficial
(D) does not adequately address the possibility that
employee productivity is strongly affected by
factors other than employees’ motivation to
work productively
(E) fails to consider that even if employees are
already motivated to work productively,
motivational posters may increase that
motivation
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5. Atrens: An early entomologist observed ants carrying particles to
neighboring ant colonies and inferred that the ants were bringing food to
their neighbors. Further research, however, revealed that the ants were
emptying their own colony’s dumping site. Thus, the early entomologist
was wrong.
Atrens’s conclusion follows logically if which one of the following is
assumed?
(A) Ant societies do not interact in all the same
ways that human societies interact.
(B) There is only weak evidence for the view that
ants have the capacity to make use of objects
as gifts.
(C) Ant dumping sites do not contain particles that
could be used as food.
(D) The ants to whom the particles were brought
never carried the particles into their own
colonies.
(E) The entomologist cited retracted his conclusion
when it was determined that the particles the
ants carried came from their dumping site.
6. Jablonski, who owns a car dealership, has donated cars to driver
education programs at area schools for over five years. She found the
statistics on car accidents to be disturbing, and she wanted to do
something to encourage better driving in young drivers. Some
members of the community have shown their support for this action by
purchasing cars from Jablonski’s dealership.
Which one of the following propositions is best illustrated by the passage?
(A) The only way to reduce traffic accidents is
through driver education programs.
(B) Altruistic actions sometimes have positive
consequences for those who perform them.
(C) Young drivers are the group most likely to
benefit from driver education programs.
(D) It is usually in one’s best interest to perform
actions that benefit others.
(E) An action must have broad community support
if it is to be successful.
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7. Antonio: One can live a life of moderation by never deviating from the
middle course. But then one loses the joy of spontaneity and misses the
opportunities that come to those who are occasionally willing to take great
chances, or to go too far.
Marla: But one who, in the interests of moderation, never risks going too
far is actually failing to live a life of moderation: one must be moderate
even in one’s moderation.
Antonio and Marla disagree over
(A) whether it is desirable for people occasionally
to take great chances in life
(B) what a life of moderation requires of a person
(C) whether it is possible for a person to embrace
other virtues along with moderation
(D) how often a person ought to deviate from the
middle course in life
(E) whether it is desirable for people to be
moderately spontaneous
8. Advertisement: Fabric-Soft leaves clothes soft and fluffy, and its fresh
scent is a delight. We conducted a test using over 100 consumers to
prove Fabric-Soft is best. Each consumer was given one towel washed
with Fabric-Soft and one towel washed without it. Ninety-nine percent of
the consumers preferred the Fabric-Soft towel. So Fabric-Soft is the most
effective fabric softener available.
The advertisement’s reasoning is most vulnerable to criticism on the
grounds that it fails to consider whether
(A) any of the consumers tested are allergic to
fabric softeners
(B) Fabric-Soft is more or less harmful to the
environment than other fabric softeners
(C) Fabric-Soft is much cheaper or more expensive
than other fabric softeners
(D) the consumers tested find the benefits of using
fabric softeners worth the expense
(E) the consumers tested had the opportunity to
evaluate fabric softeners other than Fabric-Soft
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Appendix E - Job Application Materials
Job Flyer

Sapling Networks™
Position Open for Finance Manager
We are a growing team of network specialists with the goal of
assisting companies and private individuals with network needs. We are
currently looking for a finance manager to add to our team to help manage
sales, company assets and expenditures. This is a great opportunity for
experienced financial managers to help our company continue to grow and
bring network services to East Texas.
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Requirements:
• Bachelor’s Degree in a related field (Finance, Accounting, Business,
etc.)
• Two (2) years of experience in a managerial position
• 40-hr work week minimum
• Experience using related computer software (Word, Excel, etc.)
• A valid driver’s license
• Ability to work efficiently in a fast-paced environment
• Desire to succeed and advance
• Team Player Mentality
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Application

87
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Please answer the following questions accurately.
1. What are your strengths and weaknesses?
I am a dedicated worker. I always give my best effort on any task and am
eager to take on responsibilities. My weakness is that I often take on too
much work. My eagerness to work often results in me taking on too many
projects and completing them more slowly than if I were to limit myself.

2. Where do you see yourself in five years?
I would like to be a financial manager working for a strong company with
good benefits. I would like to have a comfortable life with a secure job,
ideally working as a chief financial officer to properly utilize the skills I
learned through my education.

3. What is your leadership style?
I like to divide work even throughout any work hierarchy. I expect
employees to stay on task but to also help each other when needed. I try
to make myself available to other team members but have my own
expectations about boundaries.

4. Why do you want this job?
I really like your relatively new company and want to be a part of your
team to utilize my skills and find a career rather than simply a job. I
believe I have a lot to offer you and that this position will help me to find
success and satisfaction to my professional life.
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Appendix F - Applicant Pictures
Marching Band Member

Fraternity Member
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Appendix G - Evaluation Task
Job Applicant Evaluation
Please rate the applicant in terms of the extent to which you agree that each of
the following traits describes the applicant accurately:
Intelligent
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Insensitive
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Trustworthy
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Arrogant
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Sincere
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Inconsiderate
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree
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Friendly
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Self-Centered
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Down-to-Earth
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Rude
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Creative
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Materialistic
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Motivated
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Cliquish
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree
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Ambitious
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Conceited
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Happy
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Vain
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Warm
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

Superficial
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree
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Please rate the applicant in terms of the extent to which you agree with the
following statements:
I feel this person would make an excellent candidate for the position in question.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

I would likely give this person serious consideration for the position in question.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

I would guess that this person is in the top 20% of people interviewed.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree

I felt favorably toward this person.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree / Disagree / Disagree Somewhat / Undecided / Agree Somewhat / Agree / Strongly Agree
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